Lessons learned from the US occupation of Iraq (from 2003 to 2011) should guide the aftermath of the US military intervention in Venezuela. The US now faces the task of temporarily administering Venezuela in conjunction with the regime whose head, Nicolás Maduro, awaits a criminal trial in New York.
In Iraq, after Initial military victories, policy mistakes fueled multiple insurgencies and economic chaos, prolonging instability. The Coalition Provisional Authority committed critical errors, including disbanding the Iraqi army and implementing sweeping de-Baathification, which alienated key sectors of society and crippled governance.
By contrast, a Venezuela strategy emphasizing the preservation of local institutions, energy revitalization, and a vital U.S. economic and commercial presence can foster stability, self-finance the occupation, and align with core American interests. This essay suggests how the Truimp administration can apply these lessons across military, bureaucratic, and economic domains to ensure a cost-effective transition from dictatorship to democracy and prosperity in Venezuela.
A paramount error in Iraq was disbanding the military and security forces, which created a security vacuum that was rapidly exploited by insurgents. In May 2003, the decision to dissolve the Iraqi army left 400,000 soldiers unemployed and resentful; many joined Shi’a and Sunni insurgencies, prolonging the conflict and costing thousands of lives. This decision, intended to prevent an uprising by Saddam Hussein’s loyalists, instead backfired by removing the only institution capable of maintaining order amid post-invasion looting and chaos.
In Venezuela, the Trump administration should preserve the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and National Bolivarian Police, vetting them for Maduro-era crimes while retaining loyal, professional units. With approximately 350,000 personnel, the FANB could be restructured to secure borders, combat narco-traffickers, and protect infrastructure. Paying military salaries and pensions and retraining troops would reinforce loyalty among the military and security forces toward the new Venezuelan authorities and discourage the formation of insurgent groups akin to Iraq’s Mahdi Army. The broader lesson from Iraq: security is foundational, and co-opting local forces accelerates stabilization, reducing the need for US troops.
Similarly, the government’s civil service is essential to avoid the administrative paralysis that plagued Iraq after the fall of Saddam. The de-Baathification policy purged as many as 100,000 officials, decimating the Iraqi government apparatus and harming efforts to re-start essential services like electricity, water, and sanitation.
A more pragmatic approach is needed in Venezuela. The Chavismo bureaucracy, entrenched in government ministries and state enterprises, should not be dismantled. Instead, the administration and regime should remove high-level ideologues specifically implicated in human rights abuses or corruption, while retaining skilled and experienced technocrats. Venezuela’s public sector, employing millions, includes skilled professionals in fields such as health, education, and utilities.
Central to Venezuela’s recovery is revitalizing energy production and oil exports. Post-invasion Iraq provides important lessons in this area as well. In Iraq, US policy did too little to maintain and increase oil production in the years following the invasion, despite an initial focus on securing the oil fields from sabotage. Moreover little was done to leverage Iraqi oil revenues to fund reconstruction and reimburse the United States for the cost of liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. Finally, the US occupation did little to help the American oil industry modernize and expand Iraqi oil and gas production post-Saddam. The US passively watched as major post-war oil and gas contracts were awarded to China’s CNPC and Russia’s Rosneft.
Venezuela, holding the world’s largest proven oil reserves at over 303 billion barrels, saw production plummet from over 3 million barrels per day in the early 2000s to around 1 million barrels per day in late 2025, owing to a combination of technological neglect and sanctions. Key measures should include safeguarding Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the state-owned oil and gas company, securing key facilities in the Orinoco Belt, lifting sanctions, modernizing infrastructure, and organizing joint ventures with US oil companies to increase output rapidly.
Every effort should be made to fund US reconstruction efforts through Venezuelan oil revenues. In Iraq, the US ultimately spent trillions of dollars on security and reconstruction while receiving no direct reimbursement. The Trump administration could establish a transparent escrow account, directing a portion of oil revenues to offset official US expenses in Venezuela. The recent decision to sell 30 to 50 million barrels of Venezuelan oil to finance reconstruction is a welcome first step.
US companies such as Exxon pioneered Venezuela’s oil industry in the early 1920s, only to face nationalization in the 1970s and again in 2007 under Hugo Chavez. Chevron’s existing joint ventures still produce a significant share of Venezuela’s crude. Helping American firms to launch new joint ventures would bring advanced technology, capital, and jobs to Venezuela. Such an approach would displace Chinese and Iranian influence, enhance US energy security, and strengthen commercial ties with the new Venezuela.
Finally, it is essential to show respect for Venezuela’s culture and traditions and not seek to impose American-style democracy, as the George W. Bush administration attempted to do in Iraq. Although Venezuela is culturally far closer to the United States than Iraq, great care must be taken not to demean Venezuelans and their rich history, about which many Americans remain sadly uninformed.
In conclusion, there are lessons learned and risks to be minimized from prior administrations’ policy errors in Iraq — avoiding institutional purges, prioritizing security and energy, and leveraging revenues. The Trump administration is off to a good start and has the potential to advance US interests by fostering a prosperous, pro-American Venezuela.
