On July 7, Prime Minister Netanyahu will have his third Oval Office meeting with President Trump in six months. But this will be a visit unlike any before it.
Netanyahu arrives in Washington as the man who won the Twelve Day War with Iran. He will also be there as President Trump’s (occasionally difficult) wartime partner, following a swift and effective American intervention in the war – that brought about none of the terrible consequences so graphically predicted by the aides to Trump’s predecessors and echoed by the pundits. A sense of celebration is bound to be there.
And yet this won’t be a mere victory lap. In the run-up to the visit, Netanyahu’s language has changed: from a forceful focus on existential threats from Iran he has now turned to the vocabulary of regional opportunities which need to be fully explored. Trump and Netanyahu will likely focus on five of these.
First comes the question of what needs to be done to ensure that the regime in Iran does not try to revive its nuclear project. Can it be encouraged (with the help of voices such as Putin’s) to come to the negotiating table from a position of obvious weakness? This would be difficult for any leader but especially so for an obstinate, ideologically and eschatologically driven old man like Khameini. Alternatively, the US and Israel should combine close intelligence surveillance and penetration with operational readiness and international coordination aimed at intensifying “maximum pressure,” until Tehran turns around.
Second, and very much at the focus of Israeli attentions (with the public powerfully locked on to the drama of the remaining hostages) is the possible ceasefire in Gaza. The release of 10 or fewer living hostages, in return for some 60 days of ceasefire to be used for further negotiations, may seem sub-optimal but there are reasons why neither Hamas nor the current Israeli government can commit to much more than that now. Still, President Trump is clearly eager for the war to end, not least because of its toll on Israeli – and American – standing and the way it is viewed by his friends in the Gulf. Israel has accepted such a deal, as long as the agreed mechanism provides for an end to Hamas rule, its disarmament, the departure of its surviving Gaza leaders to exile, and an alternative governance for a long transitional period.
Third, and closely related, is the question of “the regional dimension” (and especially normalization with Saudi Arabia) attending any such deal. A new grouping of Israeli military, intelligence and diplomatic ex-practitioners (disclosure – of which I am one) is advocating for this, and Netanyahu himself speaks about it. But it is a safe bet that no White House signing ceremony is in the offing. A much more likely scenario would involve – if the language from Israel on the Palestinian future is sufficiently vague and does not preclude the option of (limited) statehood – a return to the pre-7 October 2023 pattern of economic ventures, open visits at the ministerial level, and a growing degree of discussion and mutual cooperation on regional issues such as Lebanon and Syria.
Fourth is the possibility of relations with Syria, paradoxically given the ideological background of Ahmed al-Shara’a, but realistic in light of reconstruction needs of this devastated country (all the more destitute once the Asad clan’s main source of income, the massive production and export of Captagon, has been cut off). Both Israel and Saudi Arabia want to see Syria focused on its domestic needs – and as much as possible, free from the powerful grip of Turkey. It remains to be seen whether the Trump Administration, with its soft spot for Erdoğan, will do its part.
Fifth, with different dynamics than those in Syria (where Iran’s agents have been hunted and destroyed), the future of Lebanon is also at stake. There have been highly encouraging signs that the present government is willing to put pressure on Hizbullah, whose strength has been greatly degraded. Even the UN peacekeeping mission in the south, UNIFIL, is more willing to do what it was designed to do. Still, Israel feels obliged to strike at Hizbullah targets almost daily (notably, with no response so far) and to maintain five strongpoints across the border in Lebanon necessary for the protection of Israeli communities in the north. With Saudi, Emirati, American and French support, the new government in Lebanon may prove strong enough to prevent Hizbullah’s reemergence. But a long and complex “road map” is needed, and this is the time to start designing it.
Added to this regional agenda are three bilateral US-Israel issues. On trade, Israel still has to negotiate its tariffs with the US. Israel enjoys at present a trade surplus with the US (Ben Gurion would have fainted from joy). On military ties, with the ten-year memorandum of understanding on aid set to expire next year, Israel and the US should begin planning the transition from aid to partnership over the next ten years. Finally, in other meetings in Washington and perhaps also with Trump, the positions and concerns of American Jews will come up; Netanyahu is bound to have some listening to do.
A visit like no other, at a time like no other. Much of Netanyahu’s legacy – and his future campaign platform (Knesset elections are scheduled for October 2026 but may be moved up) – may hinge upon his management of this intense agenda.
