Israel’s confrontation with Iran and its proxy armies, including the current operation against Hizbullah by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), should be seen as part of a broader global struggle.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022 was the first sign of a new geostrategic era, and the October 2023 mass murder invasion of Israel by Hamas was the next big sign.
Three revanchist authoritarian states – Russia, China, and Iran – form an informal alliance. Iran supplies military equipment to Moscow and exports considerable quantities of oil to China, using the proceeds to help fund its war machine. Russia also supplies oil to China and exports military expertise to Iran and supplies intelligence to Iran’s proxy in Yemen, the Houthis, to assist them in targeting ships and shutting down Red Sea international shipping routes.
Iran is the central member of this triangle for Israel. Its war on Israel has three key elements: the threat of a nuclear weapons program; its current ballistic missile capabilities, which suffered damage from Israel’s recent airstrikes; and the Iranian-backed terrorist armies, led by Hizbullah.
On the night of October 25 – 26, the Israeli Air Force attacked Iranian air defense and missile launch and manufacturing sites. According to initial reports, the strikes involved dozens of fighter jets and drones and knocked out a substantial portion of Iranian air defenses, leaving the country exposed to follow-up strikes. They also reportedly damaged planetary mixers, machines used to create solid fuel for Iran’s most advanced surface-to-surface missiles. Iran is unlikely to be able to replace such machines soon or with ease.
As for Iran’s proxy armies, Hamas in Gaza has devolved, under sustained Israeli military pressure, into a decentralized guerilla force made up mostly of uncoordinated cells in Gaza.
In southern Lebanon, the IDF began maneuvering on the ground on October 1, 2024, detecting and destroying hidden Hizbullah military bases which, Israel claims, were preparing for a ground invasion of northern Israel.
Hizbullah’s plan, called “Conquer the Galilee,” involved the Radwan commando unit using villages in southern Lebanon (primarily majority Shi’ite villages) as staging grounds. This plan was also the blueprint and inspiration for Hamas’ attack of October 7, 2023 launched by its Nukhba (“elite”) commando unit. Hizbullah and Iran, over many years, dedicated considerable resources to prepare the plan.
IDF units continue to invest the Lebanon border areas and degrade the “Conquer the Galilee” infrastructure, with their findings appearing in nightly news broadcasts in Israel.
The IDF destroyed a series of Hizbullah underground command centers, a network of lined underground pathways and rooms for extended stays, recovering enormous quantities of weapons. In some 350 weapons depots found as of October 24 in southern Lebanon, the IDF seized over 3,200 explosive devices; 2,500 anti-tank missiles, RPG launchers, and Kornet missiles; drones; motorcycles to be used for assault into Israel; and large quantities of ammunition, combat vests and helmets. They also uncovered major attack capabilities hidden in forested areas around the villages.
Looking ahead, the question remains what will happen after Israel completes the high-intensity phase of its southern Lebanon offensive.
Israel appears determined to be the one to enforce United Nations Security Council 1701 (2006), which bans all militias from operating south of the Litani River. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have been unable and unwilling to enforce this resolution and halt Hizbullah’s entrenchment along the border (which often occurred under the guise of faux NGOs and ecological organizations). Only Israel has the capability and intent of enforcing the resolution.
Israel will likely prioritize stopping Hizbullah from rebuilding in southern Lebanon, intercepting resupply of Iranian weapons via Syria, and destroying Hizbullah’s efforts to build its own projectiles throughout Lebanon.
It will also expedite preparations to defend against Hizbullah drones. These Iranian-supplied weapons are difficult for Israeli radar to detect owing to their small size, low altitude, and low speed. (Russia flies these same Iranian-made drones towards targets in Ukraine.)
If the West fails to understand Israel’s role as an outpost of a larger global confrontation, Iranian drones could be making their way towards cities in Western Europe sooner rather than later.
