Israel’s attack on Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9 jarred the region and spurred a new outburst of skepticism about the value of US security commitments. The US has long sought a stable regional environment in which American partners do not attack one another, which the Doha attack obviously disrupted.
Nevertheless, the Middle East simply has no viable alternative to US regional security efforts for the foreseeable future. Qatar and other Gulf states have been subject to other attacks that the US could neither deter nor immediately punish (such as the drone and missile strikes on Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities in 2019 and 2020). Regional moderates have no plausible alternative patrons or policy approaches that would keep them out of the line of fire, and American security commitments remain both valid and vital in important ways.
The Nature of US Guarantees
Some of the confusion here is inherent in the collective-security system the US developed after World War II, which now encompasses some 70 countries. Given the huge span of responsibility and the American people’s reluctance to get bogged down in foreign conflicts, policy makers have prioritized decisive responses to only the most destabilizing conflicts: Korea in 1950, Kuwait in 1990, and Ukraine today, leaving less significant or one-off military challenges to diplomacy or the victims’ own agency.
This American approach is best seen in the capacious language in NATO’s Article V, dictated by Washington at the inception of the alliance: in the case of an attack on a NATO member state, each NATO member shall take “such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force.”
Thus the US has not spelled out what will generate a US military response and what will not. Whether US security commitments are treaty-based or non-legally binding (like all its Middle East arrangements except with NATO ally Turkey) or just implicit (such as Korea, Kuwait, or Ukraine), they have proven trustworthy when a nation’s survival is threatened by military attack. But Washington generally does not respond with hostilities to one-off acts.
All this should not be a surprise to America’s Gulf friends. Since 1953, the US has had a legally-binding defense treaty with South Korea, backed by 28,000 troops in country. Yet the US has never responded to the many North Korean attacks far more serious than Israel’s strike in Doha, including a huge commando attack on the South Korean president’s residence in 1968, the killing of four South Korean cabinet members in Burma in 1983, or the sinking of a South Korean corvette with 46 killed-in-action in 2010.
Indeed, the US often does not respond militarily to attacks on its own personnel and installations, including the capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968, the attack on the USS Liberty in 1967, the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996, the attacks on the Marine barracks and the US embassy in Beirut in 1983 and 1984, and the Iranian seizure of US sailors in 2016.
Such reluctance does not mean that US security guarantees are worthless. They are geared to deter and, if deterrence fails, to contain and defeat major international aggression.
US security commitments generally include commitments to joint diplomatic effort, consultations, and in some cases military actions by the parties to promote regional or international peace and stability. Such language characterizes US commitments beginning with the North Atlantic Treaty and most every US security agreement since then (for example, the 2008 US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement contains such language in four different locations).
Events such as the Qatar attack are exactly the sort of destabilizing behavior the US is supposed to deter, including by our friends. (The tripartite British, French, and Israeli campaign in Suez in 1956 is an historic example; US action in 2006 to halt the Israel-Hizbullah war in Lebanon is another.) Contracting states, including the US, accept a responsibility to promote predictability and stability as one non-military means to contain and deter threats to the international order or the security of the partnered states. Inevitably, the bulk of this burden falls on the United States, given its wealth and might.
The Best of Available Alternatives
This growing frustration has prompted some Gulf states to consider diversifying their options, as seen in 2021 when the Biden administration sought to resize its presence in the Middle East. But so far, no viable alternative has emerged.
The American military presence is huge and diversified, and any replacement is difficult to imagine. It consists of key bases like al-Udeid in Qatar, which hosts the Combined Air Operations Center; Naval Support Activity Bahrain, which hosts the US Fifth Fleet; and Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, which houses a US Army forward base. The US also drives regional integration based on intelligence-sharing, missile defense, command-and-control infrastructure, arms sales, training exercises, and a whole atmosphere of deterrence – none of which could easily or quickly be replaced.
The most discussed alternative is China. It has become a prominent partner in the region, signing deals with Gulf governments to expand trade, energy, and technological collaboration. Beijing has also dipped its toe into diplomatic initiatives in the region, such as the Iran-Saudi rapprochement in 2023. But China continues to maintain its longstanding and strict policy of nonintervention. Moreover, China’s military footprint in the Middle East is minimal. Beijing has thus far lacked both the capabilities and the will to provide the kind of security guarantees the US offers its partners in the region. For all its ambitions, China is neither prepared nor willing to become a security guarantor for the region.
Another potential alternative is Russia. Moscow has been opportunistic in its regional engagement while defense sales and trade ties remain its focus. However, the war in Ukraine has stretched Russian resources thin. Its long-term regional credibility remains unproven or illusory, as shown in Syria in 2024 and Iran in 2025. Russia’s largest military presence in the Middle East, in Syria, fell apart during the collapse of the Asad regime last year. That presence will take time to rebuild. Russia is determined to grow its influence in the region, but it is too constrained by its current obligations to become a robust security partner anytime soon.
Some in the Gulf look at the European Union or individual European countries as potential contenders. The Europeans are viewed as more balanced on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and they maintain very strong ties with contries in the Middle East, including a recent EU initiative to bolster relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council. But the EU is too fractured as an entity to be a reliable security guarantor. Both the organization and its member states are heavily reliant upon the US security footprint in the region to offer a viable alternative. More fundamentally, the EU has neither the military resources nor the “strategic culture” to begin to satisfy regional security needs.
Finally, some have floated the idea of a regional “NATO-like” organization. Many of the Gulf countries, namely the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are working hard to modernize their militaries and to build out their own defense industrial developments through new national strategies. These efforts will go a long way toward security independence, but they remain nascent at best. Regional coordination is both limited and heavily reliant upon US defense systems and infrastructure.
Decoupling from the US would require not just finding new partners but rebuilding the region’s defense infrastructure from scratch. And the first question would be: who can take over the job the Americans did in 1990 after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait? Who could lead, organize, and provide most of the muscle for a successful response to major aggression? And second: who else could have managed the Gaza ceasefire?
Gulf Responses – More About Leverage Than Loyalty
Arab and Islamic country leaders held an emergency summit in Doha to address the Israeli strike, but the outcomes consisted largely of rote condemnations of the strike and pledges of solidarity. The Gulf Cooperation Council pledged to form a “defense pact” and to build up the region’s “deterrent capabilities,” though we do not yet know what these ambitions mean or how it will address the fact that the US is at the center of the Gulf states’ military integration.
Gulf and regional states are likely to continue to take tactical steps to convey their ire with Washington, including the recent Saudi-Pakistan security agreement and Egyptian-Turkish military exercises. Some countries may choose diplomatic hedging, including taking public visits to Beijing or Moscow or conducting joint military exercises with Russia and China.
These moves are more about leverage than loyalty. They will be designed to remind Washington that the Gulf states have other options and will increasingly use them if the US will not rein in Israel. Trump’s recent position on no West Bank annexation, a forced Netanyahu apology directly to the Qataris, additional security guarantees enshrined in an executive order, as well as meeting with top Islamic state leaders during the UN General Assembly, all suggest the US is getting the message.
Despite growing frustration, Gulf leaders know that the US remains the only actor with the scale, capability, and long-term commitments to provide security guarantees, though they are still looking to recalibrate the partnership. Israel’s Doha strike has reinforced their desire for more transparent coordination, stronger security guarantees, and above all, a durable and credible commitment that a crisis like this will not happen again.
