The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune was pleased to speak about current events with Meir Ben Shabbat, head of the Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy, in Jerusalem. He served as Israel’s national security advisor from 2017 to 2021. Our conversation is below.
In what ways does President Trump’s decision to resume the war against Iran affect Israel’s military operations?
I do not believe this decision marked a dramatic shift in Israel’s posture. Even prior to it, tensions were running high, and it was clear that the chapter with Iran was far from over—meaning the situation could easily lead to a resumption of hostilities. Consequently, the IDF and the Israeli security establishment had prepared for such a development, utilizing the time to finalize their readiness on both defense and offense.
What is the minimum Israel must achieve for the war to be considered a victory?
To be frank, as long as the regime in Iran does not change, any achievement against it will be temporary. This is because the regime will never abandon its ambitions to realize its vision: establishing Iranian hegemony across the entire region, weakening American influence, and dealing with the “Little Satan.” It will funnel whatever resources it manages to secure—under the auspices of one diplomatic agreement or another—into obtaining nuclear military capability, a massive ballistic missile array, and proxy networks. The Iranian regime is not limited by terms in office, nor is it subject to electoral constraints. It views things through a long-term lens. If Trump is currently in its way, it will, at most, keep a low profile for a while, only to rush back to its plans once he is gone. The West struggles to grasp this mindset because it is accustomed to a democratic political culture.
To return to your question, the objective we must strive for in the near term is to deprive Iran of its ability to rehabilitate and advance its nuclear and missile programs, while simultaneously weakening the regime economically to preserve the potential for its collapse from within.
Has the war changed any fundamental assumptions about the Middle East?
First and foremost, the war has transformed the balance of power in the Middle East. The Iranian monster and the tentacles it built have been dealt a severe blow. Two and a half years ago, Iran posed an existential threat to Israel. Since then, its military nuclear capability has been dismantled, its ballistic capability has been set back by several years, and its defensive and offensive military arrays have suffered a crushing blow. Khamenei and his regime officials, who chanted “Death to Israel and America,” received a death blow from Israel and America. Israel demonstrated its ability to seize control of Iranian airspace and operate within it at will. Time and again, it decapitated Iran’s leadership and commander ranks, dismantling the chokehold that Iran spent years building around it through its proxies.
The strikes on Iran itself, the blow to the Houthis, the dismantling of Hamas, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and the shifts inside Lebanon—all of these have forced the war that Iran and its proxies are currently fighting into a war of survival rather than a war to realize their vision. The regional system is still in a state of formation and design. These shifts also bring significant challenges—such as Turkey’s standing, the alignment between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and the attempt to forge trade corridors linking Europe to the Far East that bypass Israel. In international relations, much like in medicine, there is no panacea without side effects. This is an inevitable outcome, but one that offers more leverage to prevent developments from heading in undesirable directions.
As for Israel—its greatest achievement is emerging from the profound low of October 7 to a position of a regional power that has reshaped the face of the Middle East.
Our enemies across all fronts no longer dare to think of Israel, let alone describe it, as a “spider’s web.” Anyone who believed Israel could not withstand a prolonged war has received overwhelming proof of their error. Anyone who thought they could defeat Israel in a multi-front war has also been forced to recalculate their assumptions.
The world and the nations of the region have witnessed a demonstration not only of Israel’s capabilities, but of its audacity, its resolve, and its unified stand throughout prolonged efforts to eliminate an existential threat.
It is also worth noting that throughout the war, not only did relations with the Abraham Accords nations remain intact, but trade with them actually grew. Israel’s strategic asset value has risen immensely as a result of the war. Israel is highly attractive for forging ties. Our approach is to develop these relations based on mutual benefit—not in exchange for concessions, and not out of pressure. I believe we will see additional countries join these accords. Not immediately, partly because the war is not yet over and partly because Israel is heading into elections. But over time, this will be the trajectory.
Once the dust of battle settles, Israel will shine brightly in the skies of the Middle East, thanks to the audacity, the capabilities, and the determination it displayed in the longest war in its history.
What is your assessment of the deal Israel signed with Lebanon in June? Are you optimistic that its framework for peace will soon be implemented?
The most critical element of this deal is the Lebanese government’s stance against Hezbollah and Iranian intervention, along with the legitimacy it grants to Israel’s military presence as long as the threat posed by Hezbollah is not removed. Anyone who looks at Lebanese history, its demographic makeup, and the internal balance of power will find little ground for optimism. Reality demonstrates just how artificial the division created by the Sykes-Picot Agreement truly was. In any case, we are looking toward the future, not the past, and Israel’s conclusion is the absolute necessity of maintaining a security buffer zone and ensuring the military freedom of action to defend itself.
Even though you didn’t ask, I’ll take the liberty of adding a few words about current developments on the Iranian front:
Trump has no choice but to win on the Hormuz issue! American surrender to Tehran’s demands will only fuel the appetite of a regime that uses this issue as an “economic atomic bomb,” threatens to assassinate the US president, and gives the entire world a preview of what to expect on the nuclear front.
Iran’s behavior since the memorandum of understanding was abandoned has made it clear to Trump that this issue is far from over. Even if Trump would still prefer a bad deal to a “good war,” that preference is no longer as obvious as it used to be.
The main benefit he expected to get from the ‘memorandum of understanding’ was on the Hormuz issue, and he isn’t getting it.
Tehran’s approach has left President Trump with no other option but to break Iranian resistance on the Hormuz issue through a combination of military force and economic pressure. This kind of policy will help weaken the regime—which is the single most important goal.
Turning to the United States, how much does declining support for Israel, especially among Democrats, threaten Israel’s security?
The trend you are pointing out is indeed real and concerning, but it is only one side of the coin. On the other side, the United States has seen very clearly who its true strategic partner in the Middle East is. Israel does not want to win sympathy by being slaughtered. Nor does Israel want to rely on America’s charity. Israel wants to be a strategic asset to the United States, and that is exactly what it is doing. While it is true that anti-Israel circles are investing immense effort—and seemingly succeeding—in demonizing us, any American who looks at where we started on October 7, and who possesses an ounce of decency, will admit that Israel did what it absolutely had to do to survive.
