The Islamic Republic of Iran, in the 12 Day War with Israel, witnessed the dramatic end of a strategy Iran spent thirty years perfecting and what it worked so hard to avoid: international isolation and direct military strikes on its own territory.
Learning from Trauma
Iran’s “proxy strategy” was born from trauma. The eight-year war with Iraq (1980-1988) devastated Iranian society and left deep scars on the leadership’s psyche. From this catastrophe, Iran’s strategists drew two crucial lessons that would define the next three decades:
Never fight alone again. During the Iran-Iraq War, most Arab states and Western powers backed Saddam Hussein, leaving Iran diplomatically isolated.
Keep war away from Iranian soil. The conflict brought devastating missile attacks on Iranian cities, chemical weapons, and massive civilian casualties. Future conflicts had to be fought elsewhere, using allied forces on foreign battlefields.
Building the “Axis of Resistance”
Starting in the mid-1990s, Iran methodically built what it called the “Axis of Resistance” – a network of proxy militias and allied movements across the Middle East. For years, this network looked formidable.
The crown jewel was Hizbullah in Lebanon. Established in the early 1980s, it grew into what some hailed as “the most powerful non-state army in the world”, according to the MIddle East Institute in Washington, with an estimated 150,000 rockets and missiles. Iran’s network extended far beyond Lebanon: Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, dozens of Shia militias in Iraq, Asad’s regime in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen.
These weren’t simple patron-client relationships. Each group had its own local interests and maintained significant autonomy. Hamas, for instance, often tried to avoid being seen as “an Iranian pawn.” Still, the network served Iran’s purposes. It allowed Tehran to pressure Israel and American forces throughout the region while maintaining plausible deniability.
Economic Lifelines
Alongside its military proxies, Iran cultivated economic partnerships with countries opposed to Western influence. This became critical after Trump pulled the U.S. out of the nuclear deal in 2018, reimposing comprehensive sanctions.
China became Iran’s economic lifeline. By 2021, Beijing was Iran’s largest trading partner, buying roughly 91 percent of Iran’s oil exports through systems that bypassed Western banks and shipping services. The two countries signed a 25-year strategic partnership identifying $400 billion in potential Chinese investments—a massive deal for a sanctions-hit economy.
Russia was less central but still important. Moscow became Iran’s fifth-largest trading partner and biggest investor, though Iran represented less than one percent of Russia’s total trade.
The Collapse Begins
Everything started falling apart after October 7, 2023. Israel didn’t just respond to Hamas, it went after the entire network. The Israel Defense Forces began targeting Iranian and proxy forces in Syria more aggressively. In April 2024, Israel killed Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior Quds Force commander, in an airstrike in Damascus. The message was clear: nowhere was safe.
Then came the real blow. In December 2024, the Asad regime collapsed during a major offensive by opposition forces. Damascus fell, ending the Assad family’s 53-year rule. This wasn’t just another proxy’s defeat – it severed supply routes to Hizbullah in Lebanon and eliminated the key link in Iran’s regional network.
By late 2024, the proxy network was in ruins. Hizbullah stayed largely silent. Hamas was destroyed. The Houthis were weakened. Syrian airspace became a free-fire zone for Israeli operations. Iraqi militias made threats but took no action. When Iran itself came under direct Israeli attack, the so-called Axis of Resistance—supposedly Iran’s deterrent wrapped in ideology—simply wasn’t there.
Fair Weather Friends
Iran’s economic partners have shown little appetite for confronting the United States or Israel over Iran. Despite the extensive relationship with China, Beijing followed its usual policy of non-interference and offered only diplomatic statements. Iran is ultimately marginal to China’s core interests.
Russia, meanwhile, was too busy with Ukraine to provide meaningful support to either Asad or Iran. China and Russia were willing to trade with Iran and provide economic lifelines, but neither was prepared to risk broader confrontation with the West on Iran’s behalf.
Back to Square One
Today, Iran confronts exactly the scenario its post-war strategy was designed to prevent. The country is increasingly isolated diplomatically, its regional proxy network is largely neutralized and its major trading partners are unwilling to provide meaningful support in a crisis.
Most critically, Israeli forces have conducted direct strikes on Iranian territory, something that hadn’t happened since the Iran-Iraq War.
The strategic implications are profound. Iran’s hardliners spent three decades building what seemed like a formidable deterrent system. But they overplayed their hand. The October 7 attacks and their aftermath exposed the fundamental weaknesses of Iran’s regional strategy and the limits of proxy warfare against a determined adversary with superior military capabilities.
As Iran grapples with this new reality, the lessons from the Iran-Iraq War four decades ago seem prophetic. Once again, Iran faces enemies largely alone. Once again, war has come home.
