Since the Second World War and especially since the end of the Cold War, the US has promoted international policies designed to make the world in its own liberal image. Paradoxically and inadvertently some of these policies have made the world—and the US itself – less liberal.
The post-World War II, US-led liberal order promoted democracy, most effectively in the countries of the former Axis: (West) Germany, Japan and Italy. A central dimension of this liberal order is international institutions that strengthened integration of Western economies, most importantly the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which evolved into the World Trade Organization.
Integration in Europe also supported the new liberal order, culminating with the emergence of the European Union, which fulfills liberal peace based on a high level of cooperation, including some derogations of national sovereignty by the EU members. The US led the construction of the main military alliance, NATO, which relies on an American security umbrella.
Today we are witnessing two challenges to the US-led liberal world order, supported in large part by policies of that order.
First is the rise of authoritarian challengers. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US worked to extend the liberal international order beyond the boundaries of the West, aiming to include its rivals—China and Russia. The theory was that their integration into international economic institutions and global trade would moderate their behavior in the international arena and eventually lead to their democratization.
For Russia there were hopes for democratization in the 1990s under President Yeltsin. But they disappeared quickly with his successor, Vladimir Putin. Democracy inside Russia collapsed and foreign policy became progressively more aggressive, culminating in the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 but this integration didn’t lead China to moderate its policies. Instead, under Xi Jinping, a China now enriched by access to international trade embarked on a more authoritarian regime at home and a more aggressive policy abroad.
The second challenge is the rise of populist movements in the West, strengthened by the policies of economic globalization and military interventions intended to promote democracy.
Globalization of markets led to the transfer of manufacturing industries from the US to China, causing job loss, worsening of the socio-economic conditions in the US industrial heartland, and the rise of populist movements to oppose this process of globalization.
After 9/11, the US began a series of democracy promotion military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Their failures, despite huge US budgetary investments and grand expectations, generated a popular backlash against liberal elites.
These military interventions also reinforced instability in these failed states and resulted in the export of migration and terrorism to the West, especially to Western Europe. Such export, in turn, strengthened populist leaders, whose supporters believe that only they – as strongmen – know how to cope with the terror and migration threats.
Populist leaders in the West highlight the sacredness of national sovereignty and oppose its seeming subordination to global institutions led by the liberal elites.
Trump is especially effective in portraying the liberal order as harming the US. A major example is the free trade system, in which China has racked up large surpluses with the US. However, Trump directs grievances not only towards China but also toward American allies (Europe and Canada) that were America’s partners in constructing the liberal international order. The allies engage in unfair trade practices and act as free riders while America pays for much of their security, according to Trump.
These grievances may have much validity, but they also create the impression that the US is no longer committed to the liberal international order. In the absence of a leader, the liberal order will face major constraints on its ability to function, let alone to thrive.
Currently, there is no substitute for the American leadership. Europe and Japan are not militarily and economically powerful enough in order to play a global leadership role. The European Union is split among 27 independent states—every one of which has its own national interests. Moreover, illiberal populist forces are rising in quite a few European states.
In sum, efforts to spread liberalism in the world unintentionally resulted in the weakening of liberalism both inside and outside the West. Liberalism is likely to face continuing challenges. Only the ultimate expected failures of populism will return liberalism to its leading role in the West, and particularly in the leading superpower, the United States.
