There are growing indications – not yet certainties – that the top echelons of the Iranian regime are locked in a fierce debate over a comprehensive reassessment of their regional policies. The Farsi media and public statements by politicians allow only a glimpse of the intensity of the controversy. Still, the ongoing heated discussions have already led the generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), usually quite fond of bombastic rhetoric, to take a step back and reduce public appearances.
The issue at stake is whether Iran should invest billions more dollars to reconstruct the armed proxies established in recent decades by Qassem Suleimani, the late commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force. These funds are desperately needed at home where the local currency has sunk to a record low. The main dilemma, of course, relates to the future of Hizbullah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad as well as the wide array of Iranian-sponsored militias in Syria with their Afghani and Pakistani recruits.
Many political elites of Tehran have concluded that throwing good funds after bad (funds lost during the current war) is no longer viable. The sums involved would be huge and the resupply of proxies made difficult by the loss of land corridors in Syria, with the emergence of an anti-Iranian authority there.
Problems with the Proxies
One should pay attention to – and not dismiss as sheer pretense – Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s statement that the Islamic Revolution “doesn’t employ proxies” and that the different factions of the Axis of Resistance stand on their own feet and chart their course of action independently. In my opinion, this was a loaded signal to Iran’s clients in the Middle East that they should not expect Tehran to rush to their rescue. Iran was content to let Arabs fight and die for its cause but is not willing to sacrifice its own soldiers and interests in order to bolster severely weakened junior allies. The performance of Hizbullah, Hamas and the other factions in Gaza, as well as the Syrian Army and its auxiliary units, have all bitterly disappointed their Iranian mentors.
Indeed, Iran has avoided coming to the rescue of its single most important proxy, Lebanon’s Hizbullah. This once formidable military organization saw its leadership almost entirely decapitated and most of its vast arsenal of rockets destroyed. The successors of Hasan Nasrallah had to accept a ceasefire with Israel, abandoning their commitment to a “Unity of the Fronts” between Lebanon and Gaza.
Since then, Iran has been slow and hesitant in providing Hizbullah with financial assistance. Iran has promised to compensate the Lebanese Shi’ite community for the tens of thousands of displaced persons, thousands of damaged houses, thousands of families of new “martyrs” and thousands of injured. This is causing widespread resentment amongst the popular base of the “Party of God.” Furthermore, the Iranians are turning a deaf ear to Hizbullah’s pleas to help find out what happened to no less than one thousand Lebanese fighters still missing. When the Lebanese regular army moved recently to close military bases of Palestinian of armed groups in the country, especially the Popular Front, there was not one word of reprimand from Tehran.
Reconstituting Hizbullah’s military strength, if possible, will require many years. Therefore, Iran concentrates on arresting the decline of its political influence within Lebanon and defections of former partners. The Druze as well as some Christian and Sunni factions have started distancing themselves from the “Camp of Resistance. ” It’s quite clear now that Hizbullah’s candidate, Suliman Franjieh, cannot be elected as the next president of Lebanon.
The Iranians also came quickly, if grudgingly, to terms with the loss of their most important Arab ally, the Assad regime, hurriedly evacuating all Iranians from the country. Despite widespread rumors to the contrary, there appears to be no attempt to organize armed opposition to the takeover of Damascus, as proposed by some senior officers of the Assad regime who fled to Iraq. Instead, Iran is publicly begging Ahmed al-Shara’a to allow reopening its embassy in the capital. Criticism of the vehemently anti-Iranian Sunni Islamist leader has been muted.
Closer to home in Iraq, the IRGC instructed the multitude of Shi’ite armed militias not to cross the border into Syria and to stop launching rockets and drones against Israel. The Iranians refrain from openly confronting important Iraqi Shi’ite leaders – Grand Ayatullah Ali Sistani, Prime Minister Mohammad Sudani and popular leader Muqtada al-Sadr – who have raised their voices against the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization militias. Each of them in his own way says now that weapons should be in the hands of the Iraqi state, which alone is authorized to start hostilities.
The Iranians have only limited control over their Houthi partners in Yemen. They have supplied them for years with advanced weapon systems and provided training and support in establishing local production facilities. But Tehran is aware that it cannot instruct the Sana’a regime how to conduct military operations or when to lift the blockade on the Red Sea.
In the Palestinian arena, Iran is losing ground to Turkey. Hamas leaders prefer Istanbul over Tehran as their headquarters. The Palestinian Authority views Turkey as its potential partner and the Turks are trying to push their way into Gaza once the current war ends.
Competition with Turkey
A major part of the reassessment in Iran is linked to the deterioration in relations with Turkey. The two non-Arab former empires of the Middle East have maintained a mixture of competition and cooperation over the past 200 years. Yet, the transformed geopolitical landscape, brought about by Israel’s military campaigns in Lebanon and Gaza, presents new opportunities for Turkey which President Erdoğan is losing no time in exploiting. Turkey seeks to replace Iran as the dominant power in Syria and the rest of the Fertile Crescent. Top Iranian politicians and pundits are attacking Turkish policies and aspirations daily, accusing Erdoğan of neo-Ottoman ambitions. The inauguration of a Farsi station by Turkey’s national broadcaster was described in Tehran as a “declaration of war.” Iran’s designs clash with Turkish dynamism not only by turning Syria into a Turkish zone of influence and striving to crush Kurdish autonomy, but also in Lebanon where Turkey keeps busy reviving Sunni political activism, and in Iraq where Turkey is challenging Iran’s supremacy. The rivalry has spread to other regions from the Caucasus to the Horn of Africa.
Clearly, Turkey has many advantages in this competition. Though the two countries have similar size populations, Turkey’s economy is three times larger. Turkey’s modern army is much bigger and far better equipped than Iran’s. Turkey is member of NATO whereas Iran is subject to heavy international sanctions. Arab states feel more comfortable doing business with Turkey than with the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, although hostile to Israel, Turkey can easily switch to rapprochement, as it had done in the past.
Conclusion
Iran appears to be retreating from – or at least revisiting – the doctrine of forward defense: establishing a chain of well-equipped militias far from its own borders as a protective barrier for its own territory. Israel’s military successes, following its colossal failure on October 7th, 2023, have demonstrated to Tehran that the vision of positioning a “Ring of Fire” around Israel has not paid the expected dividends.
The debate in Tehran is far from over. Reformers led by President Pezeshqian advocate reconciliation with the US and EU through a new nuclear deal, while many hardliners demand that Iran make a dash for a nuclear weapon, especially after its air defense systems were knocked out by the Israeli air force. Reformers prioritize overcoming severe economic hardships, while hardliners emphasis regime survival. Reformers criticize the failed adventurous exploits in the Levant, while hardliners mourn that Iran did not prove proactive enough and instead pursued “strategic patience.” For the time being, the regime appears to adopt a slogan of “nuclear deterrence” – get close to an arsenal but refrain from assembling. On the question of the proxies, they seem to prefer a wait-and-see approach.
We have reached a point when the US together with key European and Arab states may be able to influence the direction of the contest within Iran. A sober combination of carrots and sticks can go a long way.
